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ABSTRACT 
 
Paper analyzes the impact of incentives and disincentives on the decision-making of individuals. Their role in the 
decision-making processes is huge, as they affect the cost-benefit analysis of investment projects of scarce 
resources. They both are subject of huge negative effects. A hidden trap of providing incentives is represented by 
costs any such activity involves, with coercive subsidies having socialized costs for the benefits of individuals. 
This makes them very dangerous and controversial. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Austrian economist and philosopher, Ludwig von Mises (1949), defined an action as a 
purposeful behavior, or “a will put into operation and transformed into an agency, aiming at 
ends and goals, the ego’s meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its 
environment, and a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines 
his life.” People act according to their rational self-interest. In order to survive, everything in 
nature acts according to its self-interest (Rand 1967); a lion has to hunt or to starve, a deer has 
to run from the hunter or be eaten, amoeba takes chemicals from other amoebas would like to 
have, etc. People do not use only their instinct for living as animals do, but have developed 
social interaction by which they gather information they need, capacity to think and the ability 
to reason.  
 
When deciding which action to pursue, individuals compare their private gains and costs from 
pursuing one activity, while also weighing according to what is desirable, what is feasible, 
and what is their best response as regards the dilemma. “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
self-interest,” as Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nature. People go to work to earn 
money they need for the living by which they satisfy their objectives. On the other side, a 
capitalist hires workers because he needs them to satisfy his objectives to become rich. It is a 
spontaneously well-regulated principle of the matching the two rational self-interests, 
managed by invisible hands of the two. 
 
In such spontaneously regulated system, incentives and disincentives represent an essence of 
people’s decision-making. Incentives and disincentives alter the feasibility constraint in the 
above tradeoff and step into the principle of spontaneous order of self-interests. Incentives 
could be defined as any action, tangible or intangible, that provides motive for a particular 
course of action, and disincentive as any such action that lessens the motive for a particular 
course of action. Incentives have positive motivational influence on the people, while 
disincentives a negative one. As such, incentives induce reallocation of activities towards 
those that are subject of an incentive and away from those that are not, or are subject of a 
disincentive (see Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, and Baker 1992). 
 
A lot of research has been done on the role of incentives in firms (Jensen and Murphy 1990, 
Prendergast 1999). The answer how incentives and disincentives induce moral hazard and 
affect the decision-making of the people is not universal as people differ in their preferences, 
knowledge, attitudes, and other individual-specific characteristics. An important characteristic 
of them both is that they might arise from individuals, or from the outside. Secondly, 
incentives and disincentives might be market-based or coercive. Examples of coercive 
incentives and disincentives that do not arise upon the voluntarily relationship of individuals 
are provisions made by politicians. Such coercive disincentives are most commonly done 
through taxes and other provisions that harm personal and economic freedoms of individuals, 
while subsidies represent a common way of providing incentives to individuals.  
 
The role of government expenditures on decision-making of people has been investigated by 
Brock and Turnovsky (1981). Devereux and Griffith (1998) show that corporate taxes affect 
the decision-making of multinational firms where to invest, and Judd (1985, 1999), Jones et 
al. (1993), King and Rebelo (1990) and others proved the negative impact of taxes on the 
production process. 
 
In the paper, I do not argue about the appropriate or even optimal course of action of 
individuals, neither what it should be, because both are far beyond the possible. Namely, the 
behavior of heterogeneous individuals in pursuing their self-interest cannot have an optimal 
upside-down solution (see Hayek 1945). Instead, the analysis is focused on the effects 
incentives and disincentives might induce on a decision-making in an environment of 
interacting individuals. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
game of disincentives through taxes, and Section 3 provides a game of incentives when 
subsidizing the production of corn. All games are iterated forward. Section 4 gives some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 Income taxes and the choice of the residency 
 
The power to tax is the most familiar manifestation of the coercion of governments against 
individuals, and one of the most familiar manifestations of providing disincentives to people, 
forcing them to find alternative solutions. Roy’s model deals with such questions which kinds 
of persons find it more worthwhile to migrate (Roy 1951; Heckman and Honore 1990; Borjas 
1999). The model was developed to explain occupational choice when individuals differ in 
their endowments of occupational-specific skills, but the intuition is easily transferable to 
explain the selection of residency when individuals face different tax rates, which affect their 
wealth. Taxation as such has two kinds of intertwined drawbacks, one affecting the other. One 
is moral within the principles of individual and economic freedom, and the other is within the 
context of efficient allocation of scarce resources. Since skilled and productive individuals 
represent a major determinant of long-run growth (Lucas 1988, Romer 1990), such migration 
of high-skilled individuals is detrimental for the economy for the country of emigration.  
 
We make a simple taxation game. Consider a group of 1.000n =  individuals. Part of them, 
denoted P , are high productive individuals and the rest, ( )1L P= −  less productive. We have 
two neighboring countries, A  and B  in a Tiebout environment of open border world with 
free movements of capital and the people between them. Individuals are connected in the 
social network (Watts and Strogatz 1998). Assume that individuals are endowed with H  units 
of human capital, which is subject to taxation, where T  represent a tax-rate. Taxes lessen the 
value of human capital of an individual to ( )1NH T H= − ⋅ . It is assumed that individuals are 
concerned only in the value of the after-tax human capital. The level of productivity of 
individuals is exogenous in the model and constant. This means that less productive 
individuals cannot improve their productivity and high productive individuals cannot lose it. 
They can adapt to the changing taxation in one country by changing the residency. We 
assume that changing a residency is not subject to any additional costs and that individuals in 
other country get suitable employment as was in the country he left. We also assume that tax 
policies are the only ways by which countries can enter into the process of individuals’ 
decision-making.  
 
Assume that country A is a flat-tax rate jurisdiction of 25FT =  percent, while country B has 
two tax rates. PT  is levied on high-productive individuals and LT  is levied on low-productive 
individuals. We assume that 20LT =  percent throughout the game, while 25PT =  percent in 
the beginning is the same as in country A . In simulations, we analyze how increased tax 
levels on productive individuals in a country B  subordinated to the changing levels of human 
capital of high productive individuals change the decision-making of individuals. This is done 
by a step of 5τ =  percent (denoted tau in Figures 1) where P PT T τ= +  on the sample space 
25.0 75.0PT≤ ≤  percent. The games begin with a random distribution of individuals of both 
productivities in both countries, thus 0.5P L= = .  
 
In the beginning, values of human capital of both groups of individuals are the same, 
10P LH H= =  units. To analyze how high-productive individuals react to the changing level 
of their human capital subordinated to the height of the tax rate, we use a step of 1.0p =  units 
on the value of their human capital on the sample space 10.0 20.0PH≤ ≤  with P PH H p= + . 
The value of human capital of low productive individuals is the same throughout the games 
and equals 10LH =  units. Individuals accumulate the value of their after-tax human capital in 
time, ( )1t tW W+ = + •  where 1tW +  and tW  represent the value of the accumulated human 
capital of individuals in time intervals 1t +  and t , while ( )•  represents the value of after-tax 
human capital that an individual receives through one of the following decisions. We assume 
that 0 0W = . 
 
 P L 
A ( )1 F PT H− ⋅  ( )1 F LT H− ⋅  
B ( )1 P PT H− ⋅  ( )1 L LT H− ⋅  
 
FIGURE 1a: Productive individuals in country A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1b: Productive individuals in country B 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1c: Non-productive individuals in country A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1d: Non-productive individuals in country B 
 
 
 
Simulations of the tax-rate games demonstrate that high productive individuals from a high 
tax-rate country B settle in a low-tax rate country A  (Figure 1a) as the level of taxation in 
country B is raising. Figures 1c and 1d reveal that under the modeled circumstances the 
outflow of productive individuals attracts also low-productive individuals to move to country 
A , despite they are levied at a slightly higher tax-rate of 5  percentage points. Thus, 
disincentives through taxes on high-productive individuals produce huge allocation effects as 
assumed by the Roy’s model. 
 
 
3 Subsidies in the decision-making: corn or soybean? 
 
We now turn to provisions that are considered as incentives to individuals and first give a 
short note on investments.  
 
Every investment is the act of incurring immediate or delayed costs in the expectation of a 
reward in the future. To consider investments as options means that individuals not only 
consider outcomes of an investment but also prospects of modifying investments in the future 
with the arrival of new information (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Irreversibility, the ability to 
delay an investment and the option to invest are some common characteristics of investments, 
for which they are as options to individuals. As long as it is expected that one investment 
alternative outperforms another, it is expected that individuals grasp it.  
 
In such market-based mechanism, subsidizing alternative investments presents a good enough 
incentive for individuals to switch from their current and more efficient activities to the 
subsidized and less efficient one. Granting subsidies to individuals has at least following huge 
negative consequences. Subsidies follow a no-free-lunch principle, meaning that a subsidy 
cannot be smaller then taxes are. Because a subsidy represents a costless-money for the 
recipient, granting them stimulates rent-seeking making such activities superior to production 
activities (Tullock 1967, Becker 1983, Murphy et al. 1993). Administrative expenditures that 
come up with subsidizing and misspending induce that the amount of subsidies is always 
much smaller than the amount of collected taxes. Important questions when granting subsidies 
are at least the following: which sectors or individuals will be subject to a subsidy and who 
will choose them; what will be the period of subsidizing the activities or individuals; and what 
are the foundations to grant subsidies to individuals for inefficient use of resources if such 
activities are not market prospective. As subsidies are an act of incentives for individuals, 
they have huge allocation effects of scarce resources, moving them from efficient into an 
inefficient use. However, because individuals pursue the most efficient use of their resources 
when valuing investment opportunities, they require the subsidy of at least the height of the 
loss if resources are not employed in their most efficient use. The danger of subsidizing 
activities might also lead to overinvestment or overspending in a subsidized activity, having a 
whole set of additional negative effects, i.e. bubble in a secondary-mortgage market due to the 
CRA. 
 
We make a simple simulation test to analyze the role of subsidies in the decision-making of 
individuals when they decide which crop to produce: soybean or subsidized corn. Consider 
again a group of 1.000n =  individuals-farmers connected in a social network. Farmers decide 
whether to use the soil for a production of corn or soybean, or share the soil with the 
0 1Cp≤ ≤  part for production of a soybean and ( )1 Cp−  part for a production of corn. By 
sharing the soil on two parts, farmers make a portfolio from the two. We assume that there are 
no additional costs when farmers move from one activity to the other. Each alternative is 
subject to costs and income. The income from the production of soybean is denoted I  and 
costs in the production of soybean C , while income in production of corn is denoted Io  and 
costs Co . A subsidy to the production of corn is denoted S . Farmers accumulate their 
income in time, ( )1t tW W+ = + •  where 1tW +  and tW  represent wealth of individuals in time 
intervals 1t +  and t , while ( )•  represents an income that an individual receives through one 
of the following decisions. We assume that 0 0W = . A one-time matrix of payoffs is 
represented as follows. 
 
 Farmer 
Soybean I C−  
Portfolio ( ) ( ) ( )1I C Cp Cp Io Co S− ⋅ + − ⋅ − +
Corn Io Co S− +  
When choosing which alternative to take, farmers consider the profit from the investment. 
Data for the two crops are taken from the USDA database and refer to the year 2007 for the 
United States. In 2007, the value added for corn, denoted Io , was on average 467.61 USD per 
acre at the total production costs per acre, denoted Co , 443.97 USD. On the other side, 
production of soybean reached a value added per acre, denoted I , of 357.99 USD, at the 
average costs per acre, denoted C , 301.21 USD. Despite both alternatives were profitable in 
2007, it is straightforward that production of soybean was a better alternative for farmers, 
exceeding the return of corn for 33.14 USD per acre, ceteris paribus. Because corn is a worse 
decision for farmers, subsidizing it is an incentive for them to start producing it. As 
production of corn is less efficient than the production of soybean, a subsidy brings about 
huge allocation effects of the use of the soil, moving it into from efficient use into less 
efficient use. 
 
FIGURE 2a: Farmers’ decision-making under subsidizing corn – soybean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2b: Farmers’ decision-making under subsidizing corn – portfolio 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2c: Farmers’ decision-making under subsidizing corn – corn 
 
 
 
Figures 2 reveal that subsidies affect the value of investments and thus have a significant 
impact on the decision which investment to pursue. There is no gain from the subsidy as long 
as its amount does not come close to the difference in the efficiency of the two uses of 
resources, a subsidized use and the market-based use of the soil. Around the value of 
bifurcation, farmers far more often opt for a portfolio of the two uses of the soil. Some of the 
farmers still opt for a portfolio although the subsidy makes the corn production more 
profitable decision than production of a soybean, while there is no pure soybean production 
anymore, despite it is market-based most efficient. 
 
This depicts the negative effects of such subsidies that the efficient market decisions are 
succumbed to the inefficient political decisions. Because of overproduction of subsidized 
activities that is likely to happen, this might pushing down the prices of subsidized activities 
thus making the subsidized investment even more inefficient. There are two another negative 
features when subsidizing an inefficient activity. As a recipient of a subsidy does not know 
whether he will get a subsidy in the future, he could lose the ability to adapt to the efficient 
use of scarce resources once a subsidy is gone. Subsidizing an activity is a subject of 
additional costs of switching from the subsidized to the most efficient use of resources once 
subsidies are over and formerly subsidized activity still inefficient.  
 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
Paper deals with the decision-making of individuals under incentives and disincentives. 
Simulations demonstrate that under Tiebout environment changing the residency is their 
response to increasing taxation. An implication of such response is the so-called brain-drain 
effect with its very negative effect to the efficiency and the prospects of such heavy-taxed 
economy. However, under the modeled circumstances, such emigration of most productive 
individuals also attracts less productive individuals to imitate them leading to exodus from 
heavy-taxed country on productive individuals. 
 
An example of subsidies demonstrated that they are a powerful incentive for recipients with a 
huge reallocation effect. Such coercive incentives are not costless, and must be of the size of 
inefficiency of the alternative use of resources. As a result, resources are used in an inefficient 
way, and they are paid for this difference. 
 
Subsidies are subject to one another negative characteristic that is due the irreversibility of 
investment decisions. Once individuals opt for a subsidized and less-efficient activity, they 
face additional costs to switch to the most efficient activity once a subsidy is over and the 
formerly subsidized alternative still inefficient. Both, incentives and disincentives, might 
affect to the state of inaction, when individuals wait to see the development of the 
circumstances that are likely to affect the decision-making. 
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